OPM: Hackers take away files that serve to trust agents

In 2015, the U.S. administration revealed that data used in clearance investigations had been stolen from the Office of Personnel Management. The balance sheet of this component reaches 21.5 million people. It includes candidates for an investigation, but also relatives mentioned in their files.

What this type of administration retains is particularly sensitive. Beyond identity and identification numbers, a survey can contain information about the relationships, backgrounds, and interviews needed to assess a person. The risk is therefore not comparable to the mere exposure of a public pseudonym.

The compromise calls into question access to systems, including provider identifiers according to the information made public in Congress. It would be misleading to tell the file as a single magic flaw: the investigations distinguish several intrusions and several sets of data.

The administration says its efforts to strengthen security have identified two related incidents. The response includes forensic analysis, notifications, and protection services for data subjects. The count changes over the course of the examination of the bases; a first figure does not necessarily represent the final balance sheet.

U.S. officials and public inquiries have linked this operation to a Chinese intelligence objective. The sources retained here do not allow to give the certain identity of all the operators or to prove the final use of each stolen file.

The story of OPM shifts the notion of loot. Some information is valuable because it explains who an institution allows to enter, know, and act et and what it knows about these people.